Published Articles
Select Publications
16. 'Epistemic cans,' (forthcoming). Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (with Timothy Kearl).
(manuscript)
*Winner of the 2024 Young Epistemologist Prize (YEP)*
We argue that S is in a position to know that p iff S can know that p. Thus, what makes position-to-know ascriptions true is just a special case of what makes ability-ascriptions true: compossibility. The novelty of our compossibility theory of epistemic modality lies in its subsuming epistemc modality under agentive modality, the modality characterizing what agents can do.
15. 'Hedging and the Norm of Belief,' (forthcoming). Australasian Journal of Philosophy (with Peter van Elswyk).
(manuscript)
We argue that knowledge is not the norm of belief given that "I believe" is used to hedge. We explore the consequences of this argument for the normative relationship between belief and assertion.
14. 'The Knowledge Norm for Inquiry,' (2023). The Journal of Philosophy 120 (11):615–40.
(Manuscript | Published Version)
A growing number of epistemologists have endorsed the Ignorance Norm for Inquiry. I argue that, in addition to ignorance, proper inquiry requires a certain kind of knowledge. Roughly, one shouldn’t inquire into a question unless one knows it has a true answer. Proper inquiry walks a fine line, holding knowledge that there’s an answer in the left hand and ignorance of the answer in the right.
13. 'Valuable Ignorance: Delayed Epistemic Gratification,' (2023). Philosophical Studies 180 (1): 363–84.
(Published Version)
A long line of epistemologists including Sosa (2021), Feldman (2002), and Chisholm (1977) have argued that, at least for a certain class of questions that we take up, we should (aim to) close inquiry iff by so closing we'd meet a unique epistemic standard (e.g., knowledge). I argue no epistemic norm of this general form is true. Rather, certain kinds of inquiring ignorance have a positive role to play in the epistemic life by licensing prlonged inquiries into questions that we especially care about.
12. 'Against the Doctrine of Infallibility,' (2021). The Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):758–79.
(Manuscript | Published Version)
According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle—made famous in Descartes’ cogito—is false. Sometimes, you shouldn't believe things even though, by so believing, you'd be guaranteed to be right.
More Publications
11. 'Evoked Questions and Inquiring Attitudes,' (forthcoming). Philosophical Quarterly (with Jared Millson & Dennis Whitcomb)
(Manuscript)
Drawing on the notion of evocation as developed in inferential erotetic logic, we defend the norm that you should only have inquiring atttitudes toward questions that are evoked by your background information. We argue that this norm correctly predicts several kinds of underappreciated species of bad questions.
10. 'Ignorance, Soundness, and Norms of Inquiry,' (2024). Philosophical Studies 181: 1477–85.
(published version)
If you like the Ignorance Norm for Inquiry, then you should also think that: one should only have an IA toward Q if Q is sound. Just as you can only be ignorant with respect to propositions that are true, so you can only be ignorant with respect to questions that are sound.
9. 'Trusting AI: Explainability vs. Trustworthiness,' (forthcoming). in H. Cappelen & R. Sterken (eds.) Communication with AI: Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press (with Mona Simion).
(manuscript)
We argue that the explainability of AI has been overemphasized in discussions about how to increase trust in complex, predictive AI. The issue of whether an artefact is explainable is (for the most part) orthogonal to the issue of whether it is trustworthy.
8. 'Divine Forgetting,' (forthcoming). Faith and Philosophy.
(manuscript)
I sympathetically explore the thesis that God could literally forget sins. In so doing, I articulate a puzzle about whether traditional versions of perfect being theology can allow for certain kinds of divine altruism.
7. 'Trust, Trustworthiness, and Obligation,' (2024). Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):87–101. (with Mona Simion).
(published version)
We argue that operative, obligation-generating norms create default entitlement to trust; norms occassion both the possibility of manifesting trustworthiness and (other things being equal) default entitlement to trust others to satisfy their obligations.
6. 'Abraham, Isaac, and the Toxin: A Kavkan Reading of the Binding of Isaac,' (2023). Religious Studies 59 (4):618–34.
(Manuscript | Published Version)
The binding of Isaac is a hard story. There is a way of reading the story, I argue, in which Abraham finds himself in a toxin puzzle (a la Kavka 1983). I explore what reading the story this way says about faith.
5. 'p, but you don't know that p,' (2021). Synthese 199 (5-6):14667–90.
(Published Version)
I explain why you should sometimes tell people things it's logically impossible for them to know... and explore what it tells us about assertion.
4. 'Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion,' (2020). Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101: 328–52.
(Manuscript | Published Version)
This paper defends a new norm of assertion: Assert that p only if you are in a position to know that p. The norm succeeds by tethering unassertability to unknowability while simultaneously untethering belief from assertion. The PtK-Norm foregrounds the public nature of assertion as a practice that can be other-regarding, allowing asserters to act in the best interests of their audience when psychological pressures would otherwise prevent them from communicating the knowable truth..
3. 'Do Great Minds Really Think Alike?' (2017). Synthese, 194 (3):989–1026.
(Manuscript | Published Version)
Short answer: No. This paper makes a case for rational permissivism, the view that two people with the same evidence can rationally come to different conclusions. This is because two agents with the same evidence can rationally weigh the same evidence differently in virtue of valuing theoretic virtues such as simplicity, elegance, and explanatory power differently.
2. 'Epistemicism and the Problem of Arbitrariness for Vagueness,' (2012). Dialogue: Jouranl of Phi Sigma Tau, 55 (1):54–64,
This paper distinguishes between epistemic and metaphysical problems of arbitrariness for vagueness. It argues that although epistemicism can resolve the epistemic problem, it can't resolve the metaphysical one.
1. 'Josiah Parsons Cooke Jr.: Epistemology in the Service of Science, Pedagogy, and Natural Theology,' (2011). Hyle, International Journal for Philosophy of Chemistry, 17 (1):1–23, (with Stephen M. Contakes)
(Published Version)
Josiah Parsons Cooke established chemistry education at Harvard University, initiated an atomic weight research program, and broadly impacted American chemical education. He also articulated a biogeochemical natural theology, which he defended by arguing for commonalities between the epistemologies of science and religion. We unearth and critically examine this under-appreciated thinker.
16. 'Epistemic cans,' (forthcoming). Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (with Timothy Kearl).
(manuscript)
*Winner of the 2024 Young Epistemologist Prize (YEP)*
We argue that S is in a position to know that p iff S can know that p. Thus, what makes position-to-know ascriptions true is just a special case of what makes ability-ascriptions true: compossibility. The novelty of our compossibility theory of epistemic modality lies in its subsuming epistemc modality under agentive modality, the modality characterizing what agents can do.
15. 'Hedging and the Norm of Belief,' (forthcoming). Australasian Journal of Philosophy (with Peter van Elswyk).
(manuscript)
We argue that knowledge is not the norm of belief given that "I believe" is used to hedge. We explore the consequences of this argument for the normative relationship between belief and assertion.
14. 'The Knowledge Norm for Inquiry,' (2023). The Journal of Philosophy 120 (11):615–40.
(Manuscript | Published Version)
A growing number of epistemologists have endorsed the Ignorance Norm for Inquiry. I argue that, in addition to ignorance, proper inquiry requires a certain kind of knowledge. Roughly, one shouldn’t inquire into a question unless one knows it has a true answer. Proper inquiry walks a fine line, holding knowledge that there’s an answer in the left hand and ignorance of the answer in the right.
13. 'Valuable Ignorance: Delayed Epistemic Gratification,' (2023). Philosophical Studies 180 (1): 363–84.
(Published Version)
A long line of epistemologists including Sosa (2021), Feldman (2002), and Chisholm (1977) have argued that, at least for a certain class of questions that we take up, we should (aim to) close inquiry iff by so closing we'd meet a unique epistemic standard (e.g., knowledge). I argue no epistemic norm of this general form is true. Rather, certain kinds of inquiring ignorance have a positive role to play in the epistemic life by licensing prlonged inquiries into questions that we especially care about.
12. 'Against the Doctrine of Infallibility,' (2021). The Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):758–79.
(Manuscript | Published Version)
According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle—made famous in Descartes’ cogito—is false. Sometimes, you shouldn't believe things even though, by so believing, you'd be guaranteed to be right.
More Publications
11. 'Evoked Questions and Inquiring Attitudes,' (forthcoming). Philosophical Quarterly (with Jared Millson & Dennis Whitcomb)
(Manuscript)
Drawing on the notion of evocation as developed in inferential erotetic logic, we defend the norm that you should only have inquiring atttitudes toward questions that are evoked by your background information. We argue that this norm correctly predicts several kinds of underappreciated species of bad questions.
10. 'Ignorance, Soundness, and Norms of Inquiry,' (2024). Philosophical Studies 181: 1477–85.
(published version)
If you like the Ignorance Norm for Inquiry, then you should also think that: one should only have an IA toward Q if Q is sound. Just as you can only be ignorant with respect to propositions that are true, so you can only be ignorant with respect to questions that are sound.
9. 'Trusting AI: Explainability vs. Trustworthiness,' (forthcoming). in H. Cappelen & R. Sterken (eds.) Communication with AI: Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press (with Mona Simion).
(manuscript)
We argue that the explainability of AI has been overemphasized in discussions about how to increase trust in complex, predictive AI. The issue of whether an artefact is explainable is (for the most part) orthogonal to the issue of whether it is trustworthy.
8. 'Divine Forgetting,' (forthcoming). Faith and Philosophy.
(manuscript)
I sympathetically explore the thesis that God could literally forget sins. In so doing, I articulate a puzzle about whether traditional versions of perfect being theology can allow for certain kinds of divine altruism.
7. 'Trust, Trustworthiness, and Obligation,' (2024). Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):87–101. (with Mona Simion).
(published version)
We argue that operative, obligation-generating norms create default entitlement to trust; norms occassion both the possibility of manifesting trustworthiness and (other things being equal) default entitlement to trust others to satisfy their obligations.
6. 'Abraham, Isaac, and the Toxin: A Kavkan Reading of the Binding of Isaac,' (2023). Religious Studies 59 (4):618–34.
(Manuscript | Published Version)
The binding of Isaac is a hard story. There is a way of reading the story, I argue, in which Abraham finds himself in a toxin puzzle (a la Kavka 1983). I explore what reading the story this way says about faith.
5. 'p, but you don't know that p,' (2021). Synthese 199 (5-6):14667–90.
(Published Version)
I explain why you should sometimes tell people things it's logically impossible for them to know... and explore what it tells us about assertion.
4. 'Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion,' (2020). Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101: 328–52.
(Manuscript | Published Version)
This paper defends a new norm of assertion: Assert that p only if you are in a position to know that p. The norm succeeds by tethering unassertability to unknowability while simultaneously untethering belief from assertion. The PtK-Norm foregrounds the public nature of assertion as a practice that can be other-regarding, allowing asserters to act in the best interests of their audience when psychological pressures would otherwise prevent them from communicating the knowable truth..
3. 'Do Great Minds Really Think Alike?' (2017). Synthese, 194 (3):989–1026.
(Manuscript | Published Version)
Short answer: No. This paper makes a case for rational permissivism, the view that two people with the same evidence can rationally come to different conclusions. This is because two agents with the same evidence can rationally weigh the same evidence differently in virtue of valuing theoretic virtues such as simplicity, elegance, and explanatory power differently.
2. 'Epistemicism and the Problem of Arbitrariness for Vagueness,' (2012). Dialogue: Jouranl of Phi Sigma Tau, 55 (1):54–64,
This paper distinguishes between epistemic and metaphysical problems of arbitrariness for vagueness. It argues that although epistemicism can resolve the epistemic problem, it can't resolve the metaphysical one.
1. 'Josiah Parsons Cooke Jr.: Epistemology in the Service of Science, Pedagogy, and Natural Theology,' (2011). Hyle, International Journal for Philosophy of Chemistry, 17 (1):1–23, (with Stephen M. Contakes)
(Published Version)
Josiah Parsons Cooke established chemistry education at Harvard University, initiated an atomic weight research program, and broadly impacted American chemical education. He also articulated a biogeochemical natural theology, which he defended by arguing for commonalities between the epistemologies of science and religion. We unearth and critically examine this under-appreciated thinker.
Current Project: Wonder Well
My current, book-length project is on the normativity of questioning attitudes. There’s a lot of information to look for in the world. We have to decide what information to pursue, and we do this, in part, by wondering about questions. Questions focus our epistemic attention. They help us to target information that bears on the question’s answer. But ‘ask questions’ isn’t sufficient advice for how to appropriately focus our intellectual attention: we want to ask the right questions. We want to know which questions are worth pursuing--how to limit our epistemic focus. In short, we want to know how to wonder well.
This project bridges debates on inquiry in epistemology, on the pragmatic function of questions in the philosophy of language, and on the ethics of investigation.
This project bridges debates on inquiry in epistemology, on the pragmatic function of questions in the philosophy of language, and on the ethics of investigation.
Dissertation & Thesis
Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant (PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University)
(manuscript)
Knowledge is good, ignorance is bad. So it seems, anyway. But in this dissertation, I argue that some ignorance is epistemically valuable. Sometimes, we should suspend judgment even though by believing we would achieve knowledge.
Rational Uniqueness and Religious Disagreement (MPhil Thesis, University of Oxford)
(manuscript)
I argue that an under-appreciated factor in how one should revise belief in the face of such disagreement is the difficulty of the question one is trying to answer. When a question is difficult, it is sometimes rational for agents to maintain their controversial religious or philosophical beliefs so long as they also reduce their confidence that their beliefs are rational. This produces tension between the agents lower- and higher-order beliefs, but not any inconsistency or incoherence.
(manuscript)
Knowledge is good, ignorance is bad. So it seems, anyway. But in this dissertation, I argue that some ignorance is epistemically valuable. Sometimes, we should suspend judgment even though by believing we would achieve knowledge.
Rational Uniqueness and Religious Disagreement (MPhil Thesis, University of Oxford)
(manuscript)
I argue that an under-appreciated factor in how one should revise belief in the face of such disagreement is the difficulty of the question one is trying to answer. When a question is difficult, it is sometimes rational for agents to maintain their controversial religious or philosophical beliefs so long as they also reduce their confidence that their beliefs are rational. This produces tension between the agents lower- and higher-order beliefs, but not any inconsistency or incoherence.
Reviews
2021. [review] 'All Things Wise and Wonderful' by E. Janet Warren, Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 73 (4):237–239.
(Published Version)
(Published Version)
