Having just finished my Ph.D. in philosophy at Rutgers University, I am a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Glasgow with the COGITO Epistemology Research Centre.
My research focuses on cases of valuable ignorance. Sometimes you're better off not knowing—even from a strictly epistemic point of view. In particular, I argue (1) that certain beliefs are epistemically damaging to one's own belief system even when correct and knowable, and (2) that it is often better to delay epistemic gratification by continuing inquiry in order to know or understand more fully in the future than to knowledgeably close inquiry now. In work on assertion, I study what good things can possibly happen when speakers assert things that they don't know or that their audiences can't come to know.
My research program is founded on the view that virtue in epistemology can be manifest in either dominant (knowledgeable) or recessive (ignorant) ways. The honest know when to lie. The brave know when to run away. The epistemically virtuous know when to remain ignorant.
Beyond epistemology, I have research interests in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of religion, early modern philosophy, and the intersection of these sub-disciplines with ethics and social philosophy. I graduated with distinction from the University of Oxford with an MPhil in philosophical theology (2014) and from Westmont College with a BA in philosophy (2012).