**Divine Forgetting**

**And Perfect Being Theology**

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Abstract: This paper begins by exploring the theological reasons for thinking that God altruistically forgets certain sins for the benefit of creatures. Plausibly, it’s possible for God to have strong altruistic reasons to relinquish certain great-making traits (such as omniscience). But according to traditional Anselmian perfect being theology, God is necessarily perfect and so incapable of acting on these altruistic reasons. More broadly, a God who necessarily has all the perfections is a God who is incapable of making a certain kind of sacrifice: God can never make tradeoffs that diminish God’s overall greatness, even when those diminishments are relatively small (like forgetting a particular proposition) and the (altruistic) rewards of making the tradeoff substantial. I argue that God’s inability to make such tradeoffs is not a trivial cost for traditional perfect being theologians who also believe that God is in loving relationships with creatures. Along the way, I explore the prospects for a less traditional form of perfect being theology, perfect being kenoticism, and different models for divine forgetting.

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**1. Introduction**

Although some Scriptures, theologians, and philosophers take seriously the idea that God forgets sins, the idea has been unpopular in recent analytic philosophy. Plausibly, at least part of the explanation for this is that a God who forgets would be a God is not essentially omniscient—and this clashes with the kind of perfect being theology that is popular (though not universal)[[1]](#endnote-1) in (especially though not only) Christian, analytic philosophy of religion.

This paper is an attempt to take seriously the thought that God forgets (some) sins. God’s forgetting sins conflicts with perfect being theology as it is traditionally understood. I suggest, however, that it conflicts with traditional perfect being theology in a way that illuminates its costs. In short, a God who is constrained to being the best is sometimes constrained from doing the best. Traditional perfect being theologians may decide that this is a cost that can be lived with, but (I argue) it is a cost that must be paid.

In §2, I explore theological motivations for the idea that God forgets some sins. In §3, I detail why traditional perfect being theology conflicts with divine forgetting, while also pausing to consider less traditional, kenotic approaches in Davis (1983), Feenstra (1989), Senor (1991), and Forrest (2000). In §4, I argue that it is a substantial cost to traditional perfect being theology that it cannot accommodate the idea that God could willingly elect to forget (some) sins, even when doing so would greatly benefit God’s creatures. I reflect on lessons learned and consider different ways that God might forget sins in §5.

**2. Remember Not the Sins of my Youth**

In this section, I survey some of the reasons that philosophers and theologians have thought that God might forget some sins.

Why think that God forgets sins? Because thus sayeth the Lord. Or at least the prophets:

I, I am He

who blots out your transgressions for my own sake,

and I will not remember your sins. (Isaiah 43:25)[[2]](#endnote-2)

No longer shall they teach one another, or say to each other, “Know the Lord,” for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest, says the Lord; for I will forgive their iniquity, and remember their sin no more. (Jeremiah 31:34)

And the psalmist prays:

Do not remember the sins of my youth or my transgressions; according to your steadfast love remember me, for your goodness’ sake, O Lord. (Psalm 25:7)

For both Isaiah and Jeremiah, God’s forgetting is a part of God’s forgiving activity. For the psalmist, it’s a hoped-for consequence of God’s steadfast love.

One needn’t think that forgetting is a necessary component of forgiveness as such to think that God’s forgiveness is intimately connected with God’s forgetting. Avishai Margalit (2002: 206) for instance, contrasts “human covering-up forgiveness” with “God’s blotting-out forgiveness.” God’s ideal or blotting-out forgiveness “overcom[es] all traces and scars of the act to be forgiven” (Margalit, 2002: 206). In contrast, Margalit emphasizes that this kind of forgiveness is not achievable or even advisable for humans, who have an obligation to remember certain abuses. On Margalit’s picture, then, God’s ultimate forgiveness involves forgetting even though the concept of forgiveness as such does not require forgetting. Divine forgiveness and the accompanying forgetting is better than God’s merely acting as though our sins have not happened because only the former fully overcomes evil by removing “all traces and scars” of the relevant harm.

In Isaiah, God claims to blot out transgressions “for my own sake.” The psalmist similarly prays that God will forget his sins for the sake of God’s goodness. Nevertheless, there’s a sense in which God’s forgetting past sins is done for the sake of humans (rather than merely for God’s sake). That’s why the psalmist *petitions* God to forget the sins of his youth and why Isaiah’s proclamation sounds like good news.

In that spirit, Miroslav Volf (2006) has argued that it would be good for us if certain sins were forgotten by a future heavenly community, including by God. Forgetting certain evils helps us to become “new selves” who are distanced enough from abuses suffered or inflicted to reconcile fully with humanity.

Like Margalit, Volf—who himself experienced abuse during an interrogation conducted by someone identified in his book *The End of Memory* only as “Captain G.”—struggles with the tension between the image of a lasting peace wherein all memory of evil is forgotten with the sense that justice for victims requires memory to bear witness to past abuse: Volf (2006: 143) worries that forgetting would be tantamount to “break[ing] faith with victims and white wash[ing] perpetrators.”

Although sensitive to these worries, Volf’s all-things-considered judgment is that the promise of a new self is worth it—if the relevant kind of forgetting is achieved in the right way. In a particularly arresting and ambivalent passage, Volf (2006: 178) interrupts his prose with a direct address to his abuser:

Oh Captain G., *bad* Captain G., terror of my unforgettable days and fear of my well-remembered nights! The strange God of utterly beautiful goodness whom I serve wants to give you a gift—and wants to give it through me! Yes, first the divine lover of wayward humanity will give a gift to me. A new self in a new world will help me let go of the memories of abuse I’ve suffered. That’s the easy part, even if now I sometimes cling to those memories as though the salvation of my soul depended on them. The hard part will be passing that gift on to you! Yes, if the faith that I embrace has it right, you too will be given a new self in a new world... But still, ...I am reluctant. To help myself entertain the possibility of future innocence for the likes of you and the prospect of my full freedom from the wrong done to me (and by me!), to water the seed of hope that God’s love has planted, I’m writing this book.

The tension is dispersed, though not fully resolved, by Volf’s (2006: 139) contention that the process by which the heavenly community forgets evil will go through a period of remembrance: “The redeemed can forget their sins only *after* they have faced their sins’ reality unadorned.” Without this stage of remembrance, (merely) forgetting sins would amount to cheap grace. Non-remembrance of evil is valuable not when it is an amnesic interruption that severs both victim and perpetrator from their past selves but as the gradual, eschatological result of reconciliation.[[3]](#endnote-3) It is rarely if ever advisable in the present life but only when victims have been fully protected by God (Volf, 2006: 172).

There’s much to process here and a need for sensitivity to particulars. Whether or not victims would wish their memories away or desire reconciliation, even in eternity, may depend on the details of the wrong suffered or the values of the sufferer themselves. Volf looks forward to the collective forgetting of his abuse with hope, even if it is a reluctant hope. But we shouldn’t assume that such hope, even for the far-off and safe future, is the only or best response to abuse. There may not be a general answer to the question of whether it is good for God (as a part of the heavenly community) to forget evil, only particular instances in which it is best to do so in light of the values of those who suffer those evils.

But it seems that for certain people, Volf among them, it could be a great gift for God to forget certain evils after a final reconciliation: a part of the process of becoming a new self. It could be a great comfort to us, from a place of safety wrapped in God’s eschatological love, to let certain memories die, both in our individual and collective memories. If that is ever the case, then God has an altruistic reason to choose to forget.

Finally, Lebens & Goldschmidt (2017) have recently argued that God un-remembers certain evils. On their view, God does not merely change God’s memories of past sins but literally remakes the past so that those sins never happened. I shall set aside Lebens’ & Goldschmidt’s intriguing but controversial take on the metaphysical possibility of changing the past, examination of which lies outside the scope of this paper. Instead, I shall highlight their claim that full repentance culminates in non-remembrance. Some of the things they say in favor of God’s remaking the past can equally be said in favor of God’s simply forgetting sins.[[4]](#endnote-4)

Lebens & Goldschmidt favorably cite Rabbi Tzadok HaKohen (1998: §99):

A sign of complete repentance is when [the sinner] no longer remembers his sin at all. …[and] if God, may He be blessed, doesn’t emanate unto him, and remind him, he does not remember.[[5]](#endnote-5)

There’s no need for God to keep record of those sins that have been completely repented of. On this view, God’s forgetting sin is a kind of certification that the repentance is complete. Sins that are completely repented from are stricken from the record—even the record of God’s memory.

Lebens & Goldschmidt are especially sensitive to the need to remember past sins on the way to non-remembrance. Indeed, Lebens & Goldschmidt (2017: 2) say that we have the duty to remember until, after toiling to repent, God mercifully grants, and joins us in, non-remembrance. Lebens & Goldschmidt thus sever any straightforward connection between an eschatology in which the sins of the repentant are not remembered and an ethics whereby we aim to forget. We shouldn’t aim to forget; we should aim to remember. God alone guarantees that non-remembrance ultimately arrives.

It’s important not to collapse these distinct visions of divine non-remembrance, which depart from each other at key points on eschatology, the relationship between human and divine forgiveness, and on the kinds of obligations we may have to remember on the way to non-remembrance. Certainly, these differences are mediated, in part, by the religious traditions of the authors. But risking a certain level of generality, we can say this: one of the dominant reasons for thinking that God forgets sins is that God’s forgetting our sins is an appropriate consequence of those sins having been properly dealt with. Like scar tissue healing, it’s the final step in sin being fully healed.

There are, of course, other reasons one could think God forgets. I quickly mention two. First, for those in the Christian tradition, Jesus is often represented as not knowing certain things.[[6]](#endnote-6) This is apparently incompatible with the claims that (a) Jesus is God and (b) God is essentially omniscient. But if God can forget—and so is not essentially omniscient—the problem of Jesus’ ignorance dissolves.[[7]](#endnote-7) (I don’t mean to pass judgment here on whether this puzzle can be dissolved another way.)[[8]](#endnote-8)

Second, there are “philosophers’ cases” that suggest God could altruistically benefit others by forgetting certain propositions. Here’s one:

Surprise Party: The angels put on a party every year to celebrate their creator. God often celebrates the angels around their creation days by throwing them surprise parties. The angels would like to throw God a surprise party in return, but God’s omniscience makes this impossible. The angels come to God asking whether God could forget that they are throwing surprise party. God considers their proposal. God knows that the surprise party would be a lot of fun. And it would please God’s angels to be able to celebrate God in the way God celebrates them. God knows that choosing to forget that they are going to throw a surprise party wouldn’t lead to any adverse, downstream consequences. The utility of forgetting is higher than the utility of not forgetting. And so, God agrees: God will forget that the angels are planning a surprise party. The party is a hit!

Perhaps some readers will think that the fun of a surprise party lacks the *gravitas* to give God a compelling reason to give up omniscience—certainly, it isn’t as serious-minded as the cases that arise in the ethics of memory. The modest point here is that there’s no incoherence in supposing that God’s forgetting some proposition would (altruistically) result in the best consequences for God’s creatures. God’s forgetting certain sins is, in this sense, just one instance in a wider class.

One might object that it isn’t possible for someone just to choose to forget that a proposition is true. Try to forget—right now—that you are currently reading! But as Stephen Davis (1983: 126) has argued, even if “humans apparently have no psychological mechanism for” directly forgetting, “there is no logical impossibility here.” Psychologically, it’s not easy for us to intentionally and directly “shut our eyes” against memories of things we already know. But there’s no in principle reason an agent couldn’t have a psychological mechanism that makes it possible to directly delete memories, like a brain-scanner out of a spy flick.

I have not, in this section, tried to give a comprehensive argument for the thesis that God forgets, or will forget, some sins. Nor have I tried to explain away other traditional sources that describe God as remembering sins, as Amos does:

The Lord has sworn by the pride of Jacob:

Surely I will never forget any of their deeds. (Amos 8:7)

Notably, Marilyn McCord Adams has argued that Christians, at least, should think of heaven as a place in which, through Christ’s solidaristic participation in the horror of the cross, “the victim’s experience of horrors [becomes] so meaningful that one would not retrospectively wish it away” (1999: 167). Agents who do not wish past suffering away might not value God’s forgetting it.[[9]](#endnote-9)

But my goal has not been to adjudicate a final position on the eschatological ethics of memory. Rather, I’ve tried to show that there are theologically important reasons to think that it would be good if God did forget some things, not least, the occurrence of evils that have been fully dealt with and whose memories are wished away by those who suffered them. At least, this seems possible, perhaps depending on (important yet) contingent facts about how we are psychologically best equipped to handle past wrongs.

In what follows, I will take for granted that it’s possible for God to have good altruistic reasons to forget some truths. The reticent reader is invited to read all future claims as conditional on this assumption.

Let’s take a step back. Cases in which God forgets the sins of creatures for their eschatological wellbeing have an interesting feature: they are cases in which God sacrifices a relatively small part of God’s (otherwise) omniscience in order to promote substantial wellbeing for God’s creatures. At first blush, this seems like a reasonable tradeoff from God’s perspective. But God’s making such a tradeoff clashes with traditional perfect being theology. In the next section, I will explore what sense can (or cannot) be made of such tradeoffs from the perspective of perfect being theology.

**3. Perfect Being Theology and Forbidden Tradeoffs**

3.1 introducing perfect being theology

God, we are now supposing, can have good, altruistic reasons to forget some truths. How should the perfect being theologian think about this?

First, let’s introduce perfect being theology. Anselm gives us a formula for defining a perfect being:

[D]o not say that the supreme essence is one of those things than which something else is superior, and do say that it is one of those things than which everything else is inferior. ...The necessary conclusion is then: the supreme essence is ...whatever is ...better without qualification than not-whatever. (Brian Davies and G.R. Evans, eds., 1998)[[10]](#endnote-10)

There are two core aspects of perfect being theology that emerge from Anselm’s definition: that God has all the unqualifiedly good traits and that God has those traits *necessarily*. Plausibly, God’s necessary perfection is a consequence of God’s perfection *simpliciter*. If God were *merely* perfect (and not necessarily perfect), there would (paradoxically) be an even more perfect being conceivable: a necessarily perfect God. So (the perfect being theologian reasons) God must not just be perfect but perfect necessarily.

If God is a necessarily perfect being, then, on the assumption that it’s better to know than not to know, God is necessarily omniscient. (We’ll re-examine that assumption in due course, but it is, by far, the majority view.)

In this section, I will explore the cost of God’s *necessary* perfection (and thereby, derivatively, God’s perfection as well). In short, here is the core tension that I will develop. It’s normal for altruistic agents to sacrifice some of their good-making traits for the benefit of others. And loving, altruistic agents make such trades willingly—even, in some cases, eagerly. At least when the benefits to others are sufficiently high, when one cares about those benefitted deeply enough, and when the costs to oneself are comparatively small. But a necessarily perfect God is often limited from being altruistic in that particularway. For a necessarily perfect God, certain altruistic tradeoffs are forbidden.

3.2 divine, altruistic desires

For the forbiddenness of such tradeoffs to feel like a cost, it must be sensible for God to sometimes desire to make such tradeoffs.

Sometimes *we* rationally choose to be less than our best. We choose to be less than our best because we care about improvements for others. Of course, being self-sacrificial too often or at the wrong times can be self-destructive. But in general, self-sacrifice can be reasonable, at least when the one making the sacrifice genuinely cares for the one being sacrificed for and when the expected improvement to others is high enough relative to the cost to oneself. Being willing to make such tradeoffs is an important part of caring for the wellbeing of those with whom we are in relationships.

Could God also (reasonably) want to be less than God’s best? Many perfect being theologians have a relational conception of God. They believe that God genuinely cares about others. If that’s right, then it seems that God could also have positive reasons for sacrificing some of God’s good-making states: namely, that doing so could benefit those that God cares about. Indeed, the examples of divine forgetting discussed in §2 fall into this category. In those cases, God could give up a bit of God’s knowledge (knowledge of a particular sin) in order to bring substantial comfort and benefit to God’s creatures. Since, in these cases, the cost to God is relatively small (a tiny fraction of God’s knowledge) and the benefit to God’s creatures great indeed, why couldn’t God sometimes value the wellbeing of God’s creatures over (a part of) God’s own greatness?

I am, for the most part, taking the psalmist (and Volf, HaKohen, etc.) at their word that God’s forgetting certain sins would be a great benefit to them. But I do want to briefly consider some arguments to the effect that it’s impossible for God to be in a situation such that sacrificing a part (however small) of God’s greatness seems worth the altruistic benefit to God’s creatures.

First, one might object that it’d be pointless for a perfect God to self-sacrifice because an omnipotent God could get whatever God wanted without having to resort to self-sacrifice. Self-sacrifice is a strategy for the weak.

But this is too quick. First, it’s not uncontroversial that even an omnipotent God can make all possibilities obtain all on their own. God can’t make a libertarian agent φ freely, for instance, else it would not be (libertarian-)free.[[11]](#endnote-11) Moreover, it’s quite plausible that among God’s aims are having free agents behave in certain ways. So, there are candidate ends that cannot be achieved by divine fiat, and self-sacrifice might be an appropriate strategy when pursuing these ends.

Second, and nearer to the cases in this paper, God might want not just to secure certain outcomes but to secure them in certain ways. Suppose that the psalmist is the sort of person who would feel maximally comforted by knowing that God had forgotten the sins of their youth. It might well be that an omnipotent God could nevertheless, just by fiat, make the psalmist feel maximally comforted *without* knowing that God had forgotten the sins of their youth. God could deceive the psalmist into thinking that God had forgotten the sins of their youth, or change what the psalmist wants, or simply activate the “comfort neurons” in the psalmist’s brain. But it might well be that comforting the psalmist in this way would not really satisfy God’s aims. And that’s because God aims to comfort the psalmist *as they are*, by responding to the desires that they actually have. God doesn’t just want the psalmist to be comforted, God wants the psalmist to be comforted in a way that is responsive to the psalmist’s real desires.[[12]](#endnote-12)

Alternatively, one might object that it’d be pointless for God to self-sacrifice because there is no end more worthy than God’s greatness that it would be rational for God to self-sacrifice *for*. But even if there’s nothing more valuable than God’s greatness, it doesn’t follow that it is never rational to sacrifice some measure of a greater thing for a lesser thing. Plausibly, for instance, liberty is more valuable than security. But this does not mean that it would be irrational to sacrifice a little liberty for significant gains in security. Arguably, human wellbeing is more valuable than wellbeing for lower animals. But it is reasonable for humans to make personal sacrifices to promote animal welfare (especially given the complex relationships humans have with other animals). So even if there is no end more worthy than God’s greatness, it does not follow that it could never be rational for God to sacrifice a measure of God’s greatness for significant gains in creaturely wellbeing.

It seems, then, that God could have the same altruistic reasons to self-sacrifice that we do. And so, we can continue to read the cases of God forgetting sins in §2 as intended: they are cases in which God might reasonably desire to relinquish a great-making state for the altruistic benefit of God’s creatures.

3.3 a potential harmonization: perfect being kenoticism

So far, I’ve suggested that it is possible for there to be cases in which God altruistically desires to give up (some degree of) omniscience in order to benefit God’s creatures. In terms of the central concern of this paper, there are cases in which God altruistically wants to forget. But, at least on traditional interpretations of perfect being theology, even if God altruistically wants to forget (some of) our past sins, God can’t. And that’s because God’s necessary omniscience excludes the possibility that God forgets anything.

In §4, I am going to argue that this tension constitutes a serious cost for traditional perfect being theology. But first, I want to pause to consider whether a less traditional version of perfect being theology—*kenotic* perfect being theology—can harmonize the views that God can forget with perfect being theology.

Recall Anselm’s dictum:

[T]he supreme essence is ...whatever is ...better *without qualification* than not-whatever. (Brian Davies and G.R. Evans, eds., 1998, emphases mine)

Anselm’s dictum is incompatible with cases of divine forgetting on the supposition that it is better without qualification to be omniscient than not. That is the traditional view, whereby omniscience numbers among the divine perfections.

Not all kenoticists are perfect being kenoticists. But those who are accept Anselm’s dictum but deny that it is better without qualification for God’s essence to include omniscience than not. (The label “kenoticism” comes from a particular strategy in Christian philosophical theology for making sense of the idea that Jesus is both human and divine. Kenoticists think that God is capable of voluntarily giving up certain traditional divine attributes such as omniscience, notably in the incarnation.)[[13]](#endnote-13) Since it’s otherwise intuitive that being omniscient *is* better without qualification than not, a key task for the perfect being kenoticist is to identify what competing cognitive property actually satisfies Anselm’s schema.

One popular kenotic response, introduced by Morris (1986: 99)[[14]](#endnote-14) and defended in some form by Forrest (2000: 131) and Feenstra (1989: 142),[[15]](#endnote-15) is that, rather than being essentially omniscient, God is essentially omniscient “unless freely and temporarily choosing to be otherwise.”[[16]](#endnote-16) Forrest (2000: 131) interprets this not as an aberration from perfect being theology but a consequence of it:

The resulting conception is of a God who had the power to remain forever unchanging, as an omnipotent and omniscient being. Such a being, even if a single person, would have been great, but there is something greater yet, namely a community of divine persons who are able and willing to abandon their initial omnipotence and omniscience.

For Forrest, being omniscience is not better *without qualification* than not. It is only better *with* the qualification that one has not freely and temporarily chosen to be otherwise. Only the more complex property, being-omnisiscient-unless-freely-choosing-otherwise, is better *without qualification*. If this version of kenotic perfect being theology is right, there’s no inherent conflict between God’s (freely) choosing to forget and God’s Anselmian perfection.[[17]](#endnote-17) Call this strategy *hyphenated* kenoticism.

 Despite what would seem to be a happy result for my project, I think there’s reason to be hesitant about hyphenated kenoticism. I’ll articulate some *prima facie* challenges before suggesting what I take to be a more promising strategy.

 By including a clause that allows God not to be omniscient when freely choosing to, this version of kenoticism emphasizes preserving God’s ability to elect what is choiceworthy or advantageous. The first *prima facie* challenge is this: the view (arguably) confuses its being advantageous to be F with its being great to be F. Consider the following story:

*The Wicked King:* Jealous of the perceived influence and fame of his sage advisors, a wicked king issues an edict ordering the death of all the wise in the land. Overnight, it becomes extremely disadvantageous for the kingdom’s denizens to be wise. After the purge, the subjects lament: “The king killed the best among us.”

Here’s a question: does wisdom cease to be a good-making trait upon issue of the king’s edict? Intuitively, no. It becomes *disadvantageous* to be wise, and the subjects might rationally prefer *not* to be wise in such a kingdom. But there’s no incoherence in its being disadvantageous to be great. Importantly, when the subjects complain that the king killed the best among us, they seem to do so truly. But their complaint wouldn’t be true if wisdom cased to be a good-making trait upon issue of the king’s edict. Good traits don’t cease to be good just because their possession ceases to be preferable.

With this distinction in focus, the traditionalist tries undercut the motivation for hyphenated kenoticism by alleging that the kenoticist is confusing greatness with advantageousness. Granted, it might sometimes be advantageous (or choiceworthy) for God not to be omniscient (but rather, omniscient-unless-freely-choosing-otherwise), as, perhaps, the cases of divine forgetting sketched in this paper show. God’s being able to opt out of omniscience would allow God to secure good things for God’s creatures. But from the fact that it would be advantageous for God not to be omniscient, it doesn’t follow that God would be *greater* if not omniscient (but rather, omniscient-unless-freely-choosing-otherwise).

The traditionalist thus attempts to give an error theory for the kenoticist’s intuitions. But simply drawing the distinction doesn’t force the kenoticist’s hand. The perfect being kenoticist may reply that they see the distinction between advantageousness and greatness, thank you very much, but they still judge that it’s *greater* (and not merely more advantageous) for God to be omniscient-unless-freely-choosing-otherwise than for God to be omniscient.

Sensing an impasse, the traditionalist moves to a second challenge. The hyphenated kenoticist has a recipe for translating (some) traditional, great-making properties into kenosis-friendly variants. Let “O” represent omniscience as traditionally understood (or, indeed, any other traditional, great-making property that the kenoticist wants to modify). When ascribing properties to God, the kenoticist modifies the traditionalist’s property by adding an unless-freely-choosing-otherwise clause. Let *Ҝ*(α) indicate that the relevant property, α, has been “kenoticized,” so that (*e.g.*) *Ҝ*(O) denotes the property of being omniscient-unless-freely-choosing-otherwise.

The hyphenated kenoticist suggests that we move from thinking of O as unqualifiedly great-making and move to *Ҝ*(O) instead. But that raises an important question: why stop there? After all, here’s another property: *Ҝ*(*Ҝ*(O)), that is, this property: (being-omniscient-unless-freely-choosing-otherwise)-unless-freely-choosing-otherwise. And here’s another: *Ҝ*(*Ҝ*(*Ҝ*(O))). And so on indefinitely. Indeed, each kenoticized property can itself be kenoticized.

The traditionalist alleges that this demonstrates the instability of the kenoticist’s maneuver. If kenoticizing a property improves it, then there’s no maximally great property of the relevant type: each kenoticized interation of the property can be further improved through further kenoticization.

One hopeful thought for the hyphenated kenoticist is that God could have *all* the relevant kenotic properties. The best way to achieve this is by tweaking Forrest’s and Feenstra’s strategy to make it recursive. *E.g.*, let α be a variable ranging over those traditionalist great-making properties that the perfect being kenoticist believes should be kenoticized. Then the kenoticist says that God has all of the following kenoticized properties: (1) for all α, *Ҝ*(α), and (2) for every kenoticized property β, *Ҝ*(β). In terms of (*e.g.*) omniscience, this would guarantee that God has the properties *Ҝ*(O) *and Ҝ*(*Ҝ*(O)) *and Ҝ*(*Ҝ*(*Ҝ*(O))), etc.

But this won’t work. It’s no good saying that God essentially has the properties of being both *Ҝ*(O) and *Ҝ*(*Ҝ*(O)). If God is *Ҝ*(O) essentially, then God can’t, in any non-trivial sense, freely choose to be otherwise than *Ҝ*(O). But if God is essentially *Ҝ*(*Ҝ*(O)), then there must be a non-trivial sense in which God can freely choose to be otherwise than *Ҝ*(O). So God can’t be both *Ҝ*(O) and *Ҝ*(*Ҝ*(O)) essentially.

In response, the perfect being kenoticist might argue that greatness of a property only increases in the first iteration of kenoticization: *Ҝ*(O) > O, but *Ҝ*(*Ҝ*(O)) ≯ *Ҝ*(O). There’s no incoherence here, but it raises the question of what explains the asymmetry: why is it greater for God to be able to (freely) opt out of being omniscient, but not greater for God to be able to (freely) opt out of being omniscient-unless-freely-choosing-otherwise?[[18]](#endnote-18)

I’ve canvassed two *prima facie* challenges for hyphenated kenoticism. Let me gesture toward what I think is a more promising strategy. The core idea behind this strategy is to argue that epistemic perfection, properly understood, reduces to (or at any rate, is more fundamentally explained by) some other divine trait, and then to argue that *that* trait does not, in and of itself, entail God’s knowing every true proposition. In particular, I’ll consider the strategy whereby epistemic perfection is reduced to omnipotence. Call such strategies *reductive kenoticisms*.

Seeing how this strategy works requires some background. Taliaferro (1985) has argued that it is not sufficient for omniscience that God knows every proposition. On top of that, God must have “unsurpassable cognitive power” (Taliaferro, 1985: 136). Taliaferro’s concern is that one can know every proposition while still being epistemically dependent or limited in a way that seems antithetical to genuine omniscience. Taliaferro is especially concerned with cases of testimonial dependence. To adapt Taliaferro’s central case, suppose you prove some complex mathematical theorem that I am barely able to understand, let alone prove. I might nevertheless come to know the truth of the theorem if you, on the basis of your cognitive achievement, tell me that the theorem is true. But although we know the same things, my epistemic performance pales in comparison to yours. Taliaferro contends that an omniscient God shouldn’t be dependent on others for the truth in the way that I was: omniscience—or, at any rate, epistemic perfection—requires unsurpassable cognitive power.

Taliaferro thus draws a distinction between God’s *cognitive power* and the *exercise* of that power that manifests in directly knowing things. God’s cognitive power is the more fundamental thing, and God’s knowledge is a manifestation thereof.[[19]](#endnote-19) Although Taliaferro thought of unsurpassable cognitive power as an additional necessary condition on the perfection of omniscience, Senor (1991: 362–63)[[20]](#endnote-20) saw that drawing the distinction raises a kenosis-friendly question: why should we think of God as necessarily *omniscient* (in a sense that includes knowing all true propositions) as opposed to (merely) necessarily *maximally cognitively powerful*? After all, being cognitively powerful seems to be the more fundamental thing: it’s in virtue of being powerful that God can know things. The core idea here is that we should think of God’s cognitive or epistemic perfection as a species of God’s omnipotence.[[21]](#endnote-21)

The traditionalist has a ready reply: because it’s (even) better to be cognitively powerful *and* omniscient than to be (merely) cognitively powerful!

But now the kenoticist will complain that the traditionalist is treating omnipotence and cognitive power differently. Consider omnipotence. If God is omnipotent, then God has maximal power. A maximally powerful God can go on to bring about many impressive things. One of those things: God could bring it about that the universe contains a planet that is a mathematically perfect sphere. But, of course, just because an omnipotent God *can* bring about the existence of a perfectly spherical planet doesn’t mean that God *has* to.

Nor does the traditionalist (typically) dispute this. Anselmians have not said: it’s even better for God to be omnipotent *and* to have exercised the power to create a perfectly spherical planet than to be (merely) omnipotent. Indeed, within Christianity, the traditional view has been that God needn’t have created anything at all. Saying that God has omnipotence tells us about God’s nature. Saying that God has exercised omnipotence in a particular way tells us about God’s activity. As Feenstra (1989: 135) notes, “omnipotence is an attribute that need not be fully exercised in order to be possessed.”

By analogy, the reductive kenoticist reasons, perfect being theologians needn’t make any commitments about the exerciseof God’s *cognitive* power. True, it would be impressive if God were to know (*e.g.*) a complicated mathematical theorem, just as it would be impressive if God were to create a perfectly spherical planet. But it’s not a consequence of perfect being theology that God knows the theorem: that’s a claim about the greatness of God’s (cognitive) activity—the exercise of God’s cognitive power—and not, in the first instance, a claim about the greatness of God’s nature. This accords with what Taliaferro (1985: 135, emphasis mine) says about the relationship between omnipotence and omniscience: “Traditionally the notion of God’s omniscience was conceived of as the *exercise* of God’s omnipotent power.”

It may be that the default situation is that God has no reason not to exercise God’s full ability to know things. And so even the reductive kenoticist may say that God’s default position is being omniscient. Or, as Senor (1991: 363) puts it: being omniscient is “a *ceteris paribus* property of divinity.” Even so, on analogy with omnipotence, the reductive kenoticist may sensibly contend that it’s not essential to God’s nature that God fully exercise their cognitive power.

Let’s take a step back. Perfect being theologians are used to thinking of omniscience as among the perfections that belong to God’s nature. But kenotic perfect being theologians (or at least those who think God can forget) can’tthink omniscience is among the perfections. This raises the question: if not omniscience, then what? What nearby property *does* God have that more accurately characterizes the divine essence? I’ve surveyed two kenotic strategies. Hyphenated kenoticism *qualifies* omniscience, making (*e.g.*) omniscience-unless-freely-choosing-otherwise the relevant great-making feature. Reductive kenoticism expunges omniscience from the list of perfections, arguing that the relevant kind of epistemic perfection is explained by some further divine property (notably, omnipotence in the cognitive domain). Without pretending to having offered a conclusive take on either approach, I’ve offered some reason to think that the second of these strategies has more promise for further development.

In favor of either approach is that it would seamlessly deliver cases of altruistic divine forgetting without giving up on perfect being theology. Insofar as this paper has argued that we should take cases of divine forgetting seriously, it’s also an argument that we should take perfect being kenoticism seriously. Nevertheless, kenoticism has always been a minority approach, and my defense of it has been perfunctory. And so, for the rest of the paper, we return to traditionalism. Traditional perfect being theologians deny the possibility of divine forgetting to preserve the theory. In §4, we count the cost.

**4. The Price of Traditional Perfect Being Theology**

In §2, I’ve presented theological reasons for thinking that God might reasonably want—for altruistic reasons—to forget certain sins. (Or, more broadly, to doff certain good-making traits.) Setting kenotic alternatives aside, §3 showed that if traditional perfect being theology is true, God can never act on those reasons: God’s nature prevents God from forgetting. God is stuck, unable to forget despite having good altruistic reason to do so. In this section, I weigh the cost to traditional perfect being theology. I won’t argue that the cost is of the sort that by itself makes perfect being theology untenable. But I will argue that the cost is non-trivial and deserves to be a factor in our overall evaluation of traditional perfect being theology.

It might be tempting at first to blow off this cost to traditional perfect being theology: God is stuck being perfect—big deal! Even if this makes some attractive altruistic strategies unavailable to God, surely God’s perfection is worth it.

Perhaps this will be our all-things-considered judgment. But if so, it’s not because the price is easy to pay. Compare God’s situation to that of this parent:

Rested Rhett: Rhett has a magical medical condition: Rhett is medically guaranteed to have a full and good night’s sleep. He falls asleep quickly when he goes to bed, has uniformly pleasant dreams, and wakes up exactly nine hours later fully rested and optimistic about the day ahead. He even wakes up with good breath. Of course, like the rest of us, if Rhett *were* to wake up in the middle of the night, he would be groggy and irritable. He would lose the good-making trait of being restfully contented and gain the bad-making trait of being groggy. But Rhett is medically incapable of losing his well-restedness in this way.

All this suits Rhett just fine… until he becomes a parent. Like most children, Rhett’s child occasionally has nightmares and wants to be comforted. But Rhett, unable to wake up from his sleep, is unable to comfort them. This pains Rhett. He would gladly sacrifice part of his good night’s sleep to comfort his child, and he hates that he is prevented from doing so.

Few parents would choose to *never* be able to wake to comfort their child. When you really care for someone, you *want* to be able to give of yourself when doing so would genuinely benefit them: it’s torturous to be prevented from doing so.

If God is personal and loves God’s creatures, it’s reasonable to think that God, too, would find it torturous to be prevented from sacrificing for them when doing so would really help. It doesn’t matter that God’s bondage is bondage to being in the greatest state. There’s a conceptual difference between the *state in which one* *is the best* (or has the best traits) and the *state one most wants to be in* all things considered*.*

In short, what cases like *Rested Rhett* or the cases of divine forgetting in §2 illustrate is this: when one has strong enough altruistic reasons to self-sacrifice, then the state in which one is the best and the state one most wants to be in come apart. And, as for *Rested Rhett*, it can be quite painful from being prevented from being in the state on most wants to be in, even if the alternative is a state in which one has better traits (for oneself) overall. If God cares for God’s creatures roughly in the altruistic way that parents care for their children, then there’s good reason to think that, in certain situations (when self-sacrificing altruism is preference-worthy) a perfect God is a kind of tragic figure, trapped by God’s own greatness from being able to love sacrificially. Sometimes the best way to altruistically care for others involves being willing to be less than our best: in the right circumstances, self-sacrificial strategies are the best ones. But if God is necessarily perfect, this strategy is never available to God. As Midas is bound to his golden touch, God is tragically bound to perfection.

There are ways to avoid this tragic consequence. But the most obvious alternatives have costs of their own. The first way is to say that God is not relational. Or, at any rate, not in a particularly close relationship with any of God’s creatures. The analogy between God being prevented from sacrificing from their creatures and a parent being prevented from sacrificing for their children breaks down if God simply doesn’t care about God’s creatures in an intimate way.

Some will pay this price happily. If God is the mere, abstract form of the good or Nature Itself or fundamentally-other-than-mere-creatures then perhaps we shouldn’t think of God as personal or relational to begin with. But many perfect being theologians *have* thought that God is personal. God acts as an agent in history (at least creating the world). God speaks and listens to people through prophets and prayers, makes promises and covenants, gives blessings and curses. God loves God’s creatures. Whether or not God is a person in the strict sense that it applies to us, God acts for reasons and is concerned with the well-being of creation, and so God has reason to act altruistically. If the best way to be a perfect being theologian is to also believe that God is impersonal or irrelational, that’s a cost we deserve to know upfront.

Second, the perfect being theologian could insist that God is not *trapped* by God’s perfection: God always wants to choose to remain in the best state. God is personal and has desires. But no matter what the potential altruistic benefit to one of God’s creatures, God always prefers to maintain God’s own greatness. This needn’t mean that God doesn’t have *some* inclination, e.g., to forget sins in a way that would comfort God’s creatures. But all things considered, God prefers to hang onto God’s omniscience. So, although God really is “stuck” being perfect, it’s always in accordance with God’s all-things-considered preferences.

But this is arguably even more costly than thinking that God impersonally has no desire for our well-being at all. This sort of God is objectionably self-aggrandizing. Consider again the unfortunate parent who was incapable of waking from sleep to comfort their child even when they really need it, ensuring well-restedness for themself but at the expense of their child’s comfort. Now suppose that the parent does not feel trapped by their inability to wake: they would *prefer* to be unable to wake from sleep. They would *always* choose their own well-restedness over their child’s comfort. (And not just in ways that establish healthy parenting boundaries or enact strategic sleep training, but in *every* case involving a possible tradeoff between their own well-restedness and their child’s.) This parent is no longer a tragic figure who feels trapped by their inability to wake, but the resulting image is no improvement. This parent exhibits selfish behavior.

Maybe in the relationship between God and creatures—unlike in relationships between fellow creatures—God has special reason to value their own great-making properties over altruistic benefit to creatures to the extent that God never prefers to execute self-sacrificing strategies. Perhaps because God not just has but *deserves* maximal greatness, or because the gap in moral value between God and creatures is so great. And so, whereas a parent would rightly be pained to be prevented from being able to ever self-sacrificially and altruistically care for their (equally morally valuable) children, God can rightly prefer to maintain their own greatness at the expense of opportunities to benefit God’s creatures.

But there are philosophical and theological reasons to be skeptical of this line. First, (and as has been discussed already) it’s not clear that the mere claim that God has more moral worth than humans automatically makes it so that God could not reasonably desire—in deep ways—to be able to altruistically self-sacrifice for them. It’s plausible that certain non-human animals both (a) have moral worth and (b) have less moral worth than humans. But it is not at all the case that humans cannot reasonably want to make altruistic sacrifices for these animals’ welfare. Nor is it clear that the appropriateness of sacrificing one’s own wellbeing for another has much to do with the ratio of—or difference between—the moral worth of the altruist and of the beneficiary.

But perhaps the more telling reason is theological. Perfect being theology has been most popular in monotheisms according to which God is a constant actor in the world who has intimate relationships with humans, either individually or corporately.

What are human beings that you are mindful of them,

mortals that you care for them? (Psalm 8:4)

It was because the Lord loved you and kept the oath that he swore to your ancestors, that the Lord has brought you out with a mighty hand, and redeemed you from the house of slavery, from the hand of Pharaoh king of Egypt. Know therefore that the Lord your God is God, the faithful God who maintains covenant loyalty with those who love him and keep his commandments. (Deuteronomy 7:8–9)

For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son. (John 3:16)

These verses present humans as objects of God’s deep care. The texts are not insensitive to an ontological or moral gap between God and humans (“What are human beings that you are mindful of them?”) but affirm that, for all that, God loves them intimately.

Is the thesis that God always prefers to maintain God’s greatness when doing so competes with benefits to God’s beloved inconsistent with expressions of divine love in Abrahamic traditions? Perhaps it isn’t outright inconsistent. But if the thesis is true, then there’s at least a stark disanalogy between the kind of love that God has for us and the kind of love shared between humans who are regularly willing to sacrifice their own wellbeing for others. And this sits uncomfortably with religious traditions that readily compare God’s relationship with certain people or groups as like that of a parent, friend, or even lover. Thus, denying that God sometimes prefers significant gains in creaturely wellbeing over God’s own greatness has costs, too.

It seems that traditional perfect being theology must choose between three options, all of which are costly. The first option: God altruistically wants (all things considered) to give up God’s perfections but can’t. God is a tragic figure, trapped by God’s own perfection against the possibility of even modestly self-sacrificing God’s own good-making states for creatures. God finds it painful to be prevented from giving of themselves in this way, just as Rhett finds it painful to be prevented from waking to comfort their child. The second option: Against the majority report in the monotheisms in which perfect being theologies have been most developed, God isn’t relational, and so doesn’t have the desires or reasons to be self-sacrificing that we do. The third option: God is relational, but God’s all-things-considered preference is always to maintain (even minimal degrees) of God’s greatness at the expense of (even massive) benefits to God’s creatures. In this way, God’s love for creatures is starkly disanalogous from human love, where the willingness to make such trade-offs is commonplace.

Any of these options is a significant cost for anyone who wants to maintain both that God has a personal and loving relationship with creation. Some perfect being theologians may be willing to bear one of these costs. But they are costs we deserve to know up front.

**5. Divine Forgetting Reconsidered: Choice Points**

We return, then, to the question of whether God can forget sins. Can the Psalmist’s prayer be favorably answered?

 One might have thought that the answer was obviously “no.” Perfect being theology, as traditionally understood, rules it out. But this would be too fast. First, as we considered in §2, there are serious-minded theological reasons (from, *inter aliai*, Volf, HaKohen, and Biblical authors) for thinking that God could have good altruistic reasons to forget sins. Doing so could (in the right circumstances) benefit God’s creatures, both signifying and enacting sin’s having been fully dealt with after a period of memory and repentance.

 Admittedly, God’s actually so forgetting is incompatible with the following combination of views: (1) perfect being theology and (2) the view that omniscience is among the perfections. One path forward is to give up on the view that omniscience is among the perfections: this is the strategy of the perfect being kenoticist. Perfect being kenoticism is not without its challenges (§3.3), but if successful, it would vindicate both Anselm’s rule and the Psalmist’s prayer.

 In contrast, traditional perfect being theology holds that there is genuine conflict between perfect being theology and the view that God can forget. But that need not mean the Psalmist’s prayer was in vain. For cases of altruistic divine forgetting are *problem cases* for (non-kenotic) perfect being theology (as are cases of altruistic greatness-reduction more generally). A God who cannot altruistically give up their own great-making states is a God who cannot love others in the self-sacrificing way that is paradigmatic of human loving relationships. As I argued in §4, that is not a trivial cost.

 I will not here attempt to tally the final philosophical score among these various choice points. What I hope to have done is to have created some dialectical space for taking cases of divine forgetting seriously, and for not automatically classifying such speech as non-literal.

 But I would like to respond to one more reason for thinking that God’s forgetting sins, in particular, is problematic. And that is that human history is so interwoven with human wrongdoing that if God forgets our sins God will have forgotten too much. Call this the *gappy history* objection.[[22]](#endnote-22) When looking at isolated instances of sinning (or being sinned against) in §2, it was natural to imagine that a creature was receiving a massive benefit by having their sins forgotten while God was only giving up only a very limited part of God’s knowledge. That looked like a reasonable trade! But if this choice is consistently reiterated, God’s knowledge of human history will become worrisomely gappy. And the trade might not look as good in the aggregate as it did when each sin was considered independently.[[23]](#endnote-23)

 One response—call it the simple forgetting strategy—is to bite the bullet. If God’s forgetting sins was a good tradeoff in each instance, then it must be a good tradeoff in the aggregate as well, even if the final price tag is staggering. We must remember the value of what we’ve purchased: the traces of all sin for each person disappearing from even the mind of God.

The reader may think I have expensive tastes. But there are budget options available. Here, I sketch several ways of reducing the cost of divine forgetting in the face of the gappy history objection. Doing so also allows us to expand on the question of *how* or *in what sense* God might be said to forget our sins.

One can make God’s knowledge of human history less *staccato* by filling it in or by emptying it even further. The *fading history* response takes the latter path. On the fading history picture, human history will be remembered for as long is useful, but gradually it too shall fade away, and memory of our sins along with it.

It’s noteworthy that several of the advocates of divine forgetting in §2 explicitly say that divine forgetting only happens *after* a (potentially lengthy) period of remembering or repentance. So, if the history of the world is forgotten, it isn’t because our past sins—or the world history such sins are caught up in—aren’t worth remembering but that they aren’t worth remembering *forever*.

And, indeed, it’s not obvious that sin-marred events are worth remembering forever. This might, as Volf (2006: 214) puts it, “pay too much respect to evil itself. What incredible power evil would have if once you had wronged someone, you, the person you had wronged, and God would remain permanently marked by it!”

Importantly, many of the reasons we normally have for remembering past sins would no longer apply within the safety of a final eschaton. We wouldn’t need to remember past sins to prevent recurrence of similar events, nor would we need to remember sins so that we could enact yet incomplete repentance. Nor would God, having forgiven our sins, have reason to keep account. The fading history view seems to be Volf’s, who writes:

The reason for our non-remembrance of wrongs will be the same as its cause: Our minds will be rapt in the goodness of God and in the goodness of God’s new world, and the memories of wrongs will wither away like plants without water. (Volf 2006, 214)

By the time we and God forget human history, we will have lived such full lives in the eschaton rapt in the goodness of God that no one is bothered that an ancient chapter of our history is no longer remembered in significant detail. Most of us have infantile amnesia: we have no or very few memories of the first few years of our lives. Few of us experience this as a deep loss. On the fading history picture, collective eschatological forgetting of earthly human history (or at least of the inextricably sin-marred parts of it) will be like that.

The *fading history* response attempts to make peace with God’s incomplete knowledge of human history. It preserves the memory of human history for longer than the simple forgetting view but still lets it go in the end. Otherstrategies for countering the gappy history objection try to salvage as much of God’s knowledge of human history as possible while still maintaining that God forgets our sins in a meaningful sense.

So far, the discussion has presupposed that when God forgets sins, God loses all propositional knowledge that the sin occurred. But perhaps this has been an overly narrow way to think about what it could mean for God to forget sins. Perhaps God retains(some kind of) propositional knowledge that various sins have occurred but loses something else.

There are at least two interesting ways this could happen. The first is that God could retain propositional knowledge that various sins have taken place but lose episodic memory of the sin’s having occurred. Some family events—even ones I have been present for—have been retold so many times or photo-documented so thoroughly that I remember that they happened even though I no longer have an episodic memory of their having occurred. In a sense, I remember (I still know propositions that describe the events), but in another sense, I’ve forgotten (I can’t relive how things were from my first-person perspective, for instance).

Perhaps this is how God forgets sins. God remembers that the Psalmist sinned in various ways. But God can’t remember what it is like from God’s first-person vantage point to *witness* or *experience* the Psalmist sinning. There is an important first-personal distance between God and events involving the Psalmist’s sins. God can’t relive our sins: God’s propositional knowledge of the Psalmist’s sin is not accompanied by the closeness or vividity of first-personal, episodic memory.

Here's another way that God could retain a kind of propositional knowledge of human history while also forgetting our sins in a significant way. God might retain *de re* knowledge of us that we have committed certain sins while losing (*de dicto*) knowledge, under a relevant guise, that *we* are the ones who committed those sins.

Distinguishing between *de re* and *de dicto* knowledge requires representing the same information under different guises. The distinction is easiest introduced through cases of unknown identities. Suppose I don’t know that Bruce Wayne is Batman. But I do know that Batman is arch-rivals with the Joker. Then there is a sense in which I do and do not know that Bruce Wayneis arch-rivals with the Joker. Since I know that Batman is arch-rivals with the Joker, I might be said to know (*de re*) ofBruce Wayne (that is, of the person who is in fact identical to Bruce Wayne) that he is arch-rivals with the Joker. But of course, in another sense I *don’t* know (*de dicto*) the proposition that Bruce Wayne is arch-rivals with the Joker—not when Bruce Wayne is presented under that guise.

 Cases of unknown identities bring the *de re*/*de dicto* distinction into focus, but it’s not necessary that such identities remain literally unknown for the relevant slippage to occur. Suppose that I grew up as childhood friends with Bruce Wayne, and I know him as a gentle and softspoken person. Like other denizens of Gotham, I also regularly read about Batman’s exploits in *The Daily Planet*. One day, Bruce confides in me that he *is* Batman. It might still take me some time to put all my information about Bruce Wayne, my childhood friend, together with my information about Batman, the masked vigilante I read about in the newspapers. For instance, I might express surprise when, over a friendly lunch, Bruce mentions that he’s been spelunking recently. This clashes with the representation I have of Bruce, my meek, not very adventurous childhood friend, even if I know *Batman* must have gone spelunking in his bat cave before. In such a case, I had already known (*de re*) of Bruce Wayne (under the guise of “Batman”) that he had been spelunking, but I hadn’t already known (*de dicto*) that Bruce Wane had been spelunking. Even though I knew that Bruce Wayne and Batman were identical, my mental boxes for Bruce Wayne and Batman had not yet been fully integrated.

Here is the proposal as concerns divine forgetting: God remembers (*de re*) of us that we have sinned, but God doesn’t remember (*de dicto*) that *we* have sinned—not when we are represented under the guise that God most intimately associates with us in the eschaton.

This proposal requires that God has at least two different guises for us—and that, in God’s mind, our eschatological guises are sufficiently dissociated from our “earthly” guises (just as my conception of Bruce Wayne under the guise “Bruce Wayne” and under the guise “Batman” were sufficiently dissociated from each other).

At first, introducing the *de re*/*de dicto* distinction to understand divine forgetting might seem like a cheap philosopher’s trick: a way of technically getting the conclusion that God (in some sense) both remembers and forgets our sins without providing any insight as to why God would find that particular philosopher’s distinction relationally valuable. But suppose that those in the eschaton are to be, as Volf (2006: 227), echoing Paul, says, dead to their old selves and alive to their new selves.[[24]](#endnote-24) If those who have been redeemed are different from their past selves to the extent that it makes sense to call them new creations, it’s unsurprising that our new selves would call for—and that we would become intimately known under—new guises. (“Repent then. …To everyone who conquers I will give …a white stone, and on the white stone is written a new name.”)[[25]](#endnote-25) Bruce Wayne is Batman; the morning star is the evening star; and we are our eschatological selves. Plausibly, our new eschatological selves will be clothed in new eschatological guises.

Let’s consider an example. Because he already has two familiar guises associated with him, let’s suppose that God represents Paul under two guises: there’s “Paul,” the guise God most intimately associates with Paul in the eschaton, and then there’s “Saul.” Paul is Saul, but in the eschaton, whenever God remembers (*de re*) of Paul that he has committed any particular sin, he only does so representing Paul under the guise of “Saul.” God knows and remembers (*de dicto*) that Saul condoned the stoning of Stephen, but God neither knows nor remembers (*de dicto*) that Paul condoned the stoning of Stephen.[[26]](#endnote-26)

For all that, God might nevertheless know the identity statement that Paul is Saul. But God does not thereby infer (*de dicto*) that Paul condoned the stoning of Stephen. Admittedly, this strategy requires that God hasn’t fully integrated his information about Paul as presented under these two distinct guises. And so, it’s important to emphasize the distinction between being in a position to easily infer something and knowing it. If God commits to forgetting that Paul, his new creation, condoned the stoning of Stephen, then God similarly commits to not inferring that information from what God already knows. This might make God less than fully rational—God will fail to know some things that God could easily infer. But this shouldn’t strike us as a significant cost at this point in the dialectic: we already knew we were signing up for subpar epistemic performance when we signed up for divine forgetting. We’re just locating the epistemic failure, not introducing it. On this picture, God’s forgetting manifests as fragmentation:[[27]](#endnote-27) God’s knowledge of our new selves is partially dissociated from God’s knowledge of who we had been.

There might be concerns about how God could voluntarily undergo such fragmentation. But this isn’t any harder than the problem of God voluntarily choosing to forget. To recycle Davis (1983: 126), even if “humans apparently have no psychological mechanism for” directly choosing to fragment their mental states, “there is no logical impossibility here.”

The *simple forgetting* and *fading history* responses to the gappy history objection try to make peace with God’s forgetting large swathes of human history: the former by insisting that the benefits are worth it, and the latter by suggesting that by the time God forgets, our sins will be so distant that it’s not important that their memory is preserved. In contrast, the *episodic memory* and *de re/de dicto* views maintain that God does, in some sense, have a full picture of earthly history throughout the eschaton while still forgetting our sins in a meaningful sense. God could lose episodic memory of our sins, losing the first-personal, memorial experience of being sinned against while still knowing that the sin took place. Or God could know the entirety of human history but only when presented under certain guises: importantly, God’s eschatological knowledge would not include knowing (*de dicto*) that *we* have sinned, when “we” are presented under the guise God most intimately associates with us in the eschaton.

These latter two views ensure that God does not have an overly gappy perspective on earthly history. Does either view secure omniscience? Thus making divine forgetting, of a meaningful sort, compatible with traditional perfect being theology after all? Perhaps they secure a kind of omniscience, narrowly understood. On the episodic memory loss view, there is no true proposition such that God does not know it. And the *de re*/*de dicto* view *might* secure this conclusion if propositions are typed coarsely enough (so that, *e.g.*, guises do not distinguish propositions).

But it’d be wishful thinking to suppose that either of these views could get *everything* the traditional perfect being theologian wanted. After all, both views still maintain that God is not cognitively or epistemically perfect as traditionally understood. Either God will imperfectly retain episodic memories or God’s knowledge of certain propositions will only be accessed through limited guises. These views still conflict with traditional perfect being theology, but they may nonetheless succeed in making the cost of divine forgetting more affordable.

In this section, we’ve moved from the question of *whether* God forgets sins to *how* God may. Different models of divine forgetting have different costs and advantages, but the variety of options should only encourage us to take seriously the possibility that God might literally forget.[[28]](#endnote-28)

1. Notably and recently, see Speaks (2018). [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. All biblical translations are from the NRSVUE. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. A useful comparison piece here is Krondorfer’s distinction between intentional acts of forgetting and “oblivion”:

[W]e can distinguish between, on the one hand, willful acts of neglect and denial (which constitute political or psychological forms of forgetting) and …modes of memory production based on sedimenting, condensing, suppressing, and expunging lived experiences of the past. It is the latter I suggest calling “oblivion” (Krondorfer, 2008: 242). [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. If God remakes the past, then even if God no longer knows what had been true in the past before it had been remade, it’s not clear that God thereby *forgets* the past, strictly speaking, since God (on Lebens’ and Goldschmidt’s proposal) still remembers what happened in the past as it has been remade. I focus, rather, on reasons God could have for forgetting things that happened in a single past. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Cited in Lebens & Goldschmidt (2017: 1–2). [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. E.g., Mark 13:32, Matthew 26:39, Luke 2:52 [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. This would, broadly speaking, be in line with a kenotic resolution to the incompatibility of human and divine attributes. See, Davis (1983), Forrest (2000). [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. For other strategies, see (*inter alia*) McCord Adams (2006) or Beall (2021). [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. There is tension between McCord Adams’s picture and divine forgetting, but they are not, I believe, incompatible. An agent might not actively wish something away while, nevertheless, being willing that it should be forgotten in due course. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Anselm’s version perfect being theology is the most prominent historical touchstone for contemporary perfect being theology. But it is not the only historically important version. Spinoza, for instance, calls God “a Being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect” (Curley (tr.), 1985: 1p11). Likewise, Ibn Sina writes “The Necessary Existent is thus perfect in existence because nothing belonging to His existence and the perfections of His existence is lacking in Him,” (Marmura (tr.), 2005: *Metaphysics* 8.6, p. 283) and later, “the Necessary Existent—who is ultimate perfection, beauty, and splendor…—[is such that,] for Himself, His self is the greatest lover and object of love and the greatest partaker of enjoyment and object enjoyed” (Marmura (tr.), 2005: *Metaphysics* 8.7, p. 297). See especially Leftow (2004) and Nagasawa (2017) for contemporary developments. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. See, for instance, work on omnipotence by Leftow (2009) and Zimmerman (2016). [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Indeed, this is another reason God has to actually forget our sins rather than merely acting as though we haven’t done them: God’s actually forgetting our sins is responsive to (some of) God’s creatures actual desires. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. The word “kenosis” is taken from an early Christian hymn in Philippians 2:7 that speaks of Jesus emptying himself of the form of God. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Morris considers but does not endorse this variation. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Feenstra’s proposal is slightly though importantly different. For Feenstra (1989: 142), the relevant essential divine property is being omniscient-unless-kenotically-and-redemptively-incarnate. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Davis (1983: 125–26) likewise gestures at a qualification-of-omniscience strategy arguing that omniscience *simpliciter* is not an essential divine attribute but allowing that “omniscience in some sense” may be. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. There is some haggling to be done over the “temporarily” qualifier. Most of the proponents of divine forgetting that this paper has considered have thought that, once forgotten, God never again remembers our sins in the eschaton. Such forgetting is still temporary in the sense that, at some points in time, God remembers our sins. But it’s not temporary in the sense that God’s forgetting our sins will be followed by a period of remembrance. But even if “temporarily” is used in this second, stronger sense, perfect being kenoticism can be harmonized with cases of divine forgetting so long as God remembers our sins once a millennium or so and then goes back to forgetting. I’ll ignore the “temporarily” qualifier in what follows. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Being *Ҝ*(*Ҝ*(O)) would, for instance, allow God to opt out of the optionality of God’s own omniscience if doing so were advantageous: making it so that God could (no longer) remove Godself from omniscience. Perhaps relevant here is that it can be strategic to *remove* one’s options just as it can be strategic to *add* to one’s options. Cases like these are familiar to game theory from, *e.g.*, bridge-burning strategies. As Schelling writes: “the power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself; [...]in bargaining, weakness is often strength, freedom may be freedom to capitulate, and to burn bridges behind one may suffice to undo an opponent” (Schelling 1956, 282). [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Cf. Senor (1991: 363): “Surely there is something in virtue of which such knowledge is had and it is this that is closer to the essence of divinity. And unsurpassable cognitive power is just such an attribute.” [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Senor (1991) differs from (or at least goes beyond) Taliaferro (1985) in taking *divinity* to be the fundamental kind-essential term that applies to God. So even if (for Senor) God’s having unsurpassable cognitive power is more fundamental than the (potentially omniscient) exercise of that power, God’s divinity is more fundamental still. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Although Taliaferro does not argue for any kind of kenoticism in his (1985), this kenoticist strategy borrows heavily from Taliaferro’s insight into the relationship between omnipotence and omniscience:

Traditionally the notion of God’s omniscience was conceived of as the exercise of God’s omnipotent power. God’s maximal power was understood to include maximal cognitive power… [and] the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience were seen to be intimately related so that omniscience was within the scope of divine omnipotence. I believe this is often ignored owing to the tendence of contemporary philosophical theology to analyze the different divine attributes in a piecemeal fashion. (Taliaferro 1985: 135) [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. I’m grateful to a reviewer for raising this problem. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. One caveat: It’s not obvious from §2 that even if God has reason to forget *some* sins God would have reason to forget enough sins to trigger the gappy history objection. After all, it might be that there are only a handful of people—the Psalmist and Volf among them—who sufficiently value God’s forgetting sins that God elects to forget theirs, whereas most prefer that God remembers their sins (perhaps valuing the intimacy of being loved even when all one’s faults are fully and presently known). Nevertheless, there may be theological reasons for thinking that God handles all creatures’ sins the same way. And, at the very least, §2 raises the possibility that God could choose to forget very many human sins. So the gappy history objection remains an important worry. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. For Pauline inspiration, see (*e.g.*) Romans 5, Galatians 2, 2 Corinthians 5. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Revelation 2:16–17, NRSVUE [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. See Acts 7:58. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. For an account of fragmentation, see Egan (2008). [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. [acknowledgements redacted]

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